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Abstract
Recently,  in the debate about the ontology of quantum mechanics  some authors have 
defended the view that quantum particles are individuals in a primitive sense, so that 
individuality  should  be  preferred  over  non-individuality  (the  alternative  option). 
Primitive individuality involves two main claims: i) every item is identical with itself 
and ii) it is distinct from every other item. Non-relativistic quantum mechanics is said to 
provide positive evidence for that position, since in every situation comprising multiple 
particles there is a well-defined number of them to begin with, and so they must be 
distinct from each other. We argue that the link between a well-defined number of items 
and the relation of identity that is being claimed is not imposed by quantum mechanics, 
but rather by a metaphysical view. Formal evidence is advanced in favor of the thesis 
that counting may be performed for items without identity (non-individuals),  so that 
quantum mechanics may not be viewed as endorsing an ontology of individuals.
Key-words:  quantum  mechanics;  individuality;  non-individuals;  counting;  identity; 
quasi-set theory.
Resumo
Recentemente,  no  debate  sobre  a  ontologia  da  mecânica  quântica,  alguns  autores 
defenderam que as partículas quânticas devem ser vistas como indivíduos em algum 
sentido  primitivo,  de  modo  que  a  individualidade  deve  ter  preferência  sobre  a  não 
individualidade (a opção alternativa).  A individualidade primitiva envolve duas teses 
principais: i) todo item é idêntico a si mesmo e ii) é distinto de qualquer outro item. A 
mecânica quântica não relativista é vista por estes autores como fornecendo evidência 
positiva em favor desta posição, dado que em todas as situações envolvendo múltiplas 
partículas há um número bem determinado de itens, de modo que devem ser distintos 
uns dos outros. Argumentaremos que a alegada ligação entre um número bem definido 
de itens e a relação de identidade não nos é imposta pela mecânica quântica, mas antes 
por uma doutrina metafísica. Evidência formal é apresentada em favor da tese de que 
podemos  contar  itens  sem  identidade  (não  indivíduos),  de  modo  que  a  mecânica 
quântica não favorece uma ontologia de indivíduos.
Palavras  chave:  mecânica  quântica;  individualidade;  não  indivíduos;  contagem; 
identidade; teoria de quaseconjuntos.
1. Ontological problems in quantum mechanics
Recent  debates  about  the  metaphysical  nature  of  quantum entities  present  us 
with three options: one may consider those entities as being individuals, as being non-
individuals, or, as a last resource, forget all talk about particular objects and adopt some 
form of ontic structural realism (OSR). It seems clear that one of those answers should 
have better  credentials  than the others,  and so,  be preferred and adopted.  The main 
problem with that suggestion, however, concerns the grounds for arguing for preferring 
one of those answers while leaving the others behind. How can we ground our choice? 
How are we to decide which is the best option? 
Historically,  the issue has been treated from a very naturalistic point of view. 
That is, the choice should be made bearing always in mind what quantum mechanics 
itself dictates us concerning those matters. In that case, the adoption of a metaphysics of 
non-individuals seems to have at least historical precedence over the other two options. 
Really,  right from the beginning of the theory it was seen by some of the founding 
fathers of quantum mechanics that it dealt with items without identity, in the sense of 
having no individuality. That is, it seemed to follow from the strange statistical behavior 
of quantum particles that they had no individuality,  no identity,  and so were a very 
strange-behaved kind of thing.  That view was called the  Received View  on quantum 
non-individuality (see French and Krause (2006)).
As is well-known, the Received View was soon discovered to be not the only 
possible metaphysical view compatible with quantum mechanics. Indeed, it was realized 
that quantum entities could also be seen as individuals.  In this case, the principle of 
individuality employed should be compatible with quantum indistinguishability; that is, 
since quantum particles were (sometimes) absolutely indistinguishable -- and that was 
one  of  the  reasons  to  believe  they  were  non-individuals  at  first  –  the  principle  of 
individuality should allow for numerical diversity without a qualitative distinction (in 
the sense of  existing  two items  but  no property discerning them).  That  is  the  main 
reason why such principles  are  called  Transcendental  Individuality  principles,  since 
they  allow  the  individuation  to  be  performed  by  something  over  and  above  the 
individual’s qualities. 
The very idea of a transcendental principle of individuality, however, did not fit 
very well in the naturalistic picture mentioned above, according to which it is quantum 
mechanics which should dictate what is the nature of the entities dealt with. Something 
like a bare particular or a Lockean substratum seems just too mysterious to be favored 
by scientifically minded philosophers. How could quantum mechanics provide positive 
support for the idea that quantum particles are individuals according to that sense of 
individuality? Since transcendental individuality poses by definition that the principle of 
individuality is not empirically detectable, there seems to be no reason to believe that 
quantum mechanics would authorize the adoption of such a principle. The best we can 
claim is that quantum mechanics is compatible with it (see French and Krause (2006), 
chap. 4 for the details).
Did that  mean that non-individuality  win the game? Not really.  Philosophers 
started to look for further individuality principles which could be employed in the case 
of quantum mechanics and which, of course, could be better suited than transcendental 
individuality to cope with some kind of scientifically informed metaphysics. One such 
approach  was  made  in  a  series  of  papers  by  Muller,  Saunders  and  Seevinck  (see 
Saunders  (2006),  Muller  and  Saunders  (2008)  and  Muller  and  Seevinck  (2009)). 
According to their approach, roughly speaking, quantum entities may be discerned by 
relations  derivable  in  the  Hilbert  space  formalism  of  quantum  mechanics.  Since 
quantum entities  of the same kind are indiscernible  in the sense of sharing all  their 
properties,  their  discernibility  comes  only  through  some  very  restricted  kind  of 
relations: those that are symmetric and irreflexive. Symmetry ensures us that there is no 
privileged  order  between  the  items  being  related  and  which  could  be  employed  to 
discern the items; irreflexivity ensures us that one item is not related to itself, so that if 
an irreflexive relation holds, we are sure that there are indeed at least  two items being 
related  (in  the  case  of  binary  relations,  of  course).  Those  relations,  then,  could  be 
employed to ground quantum entities’ discernibility and individuality. Discernibility by 
relations that are symmetric and irreflexive is called weak discernibility.
Discerning and individuating by the use of relations,  however, poses its own 
metaphysical troubles, as is shown in the history of metaphysics. As is known, some 
philosophers  have  complaint  that  relations  in  general  presuppose  the  items  being 
related,  and so they cannot  account for  the  individuality  and discernibility  of  those 
items. So, not everyone was willing to accept that quantum entities are individuals in 
the sense of being only weakly discernible (see also the criticism of the notion of weak 
discernibility in Ladyman and Bigaj (2010) and Krause (2010)). More than that, it has 
been pointed by Dorato and Morganti (2011) that weak discernibility presupposes yet 
another form of individuality, more fundamental than the one which weak discernibility 
could provide us. Really, they have claimed that the whole procedure for deriving in 
quantum mechanics  the weakly discerning relations  presupposes that  we are able  to 
account for a plurality of particles with a well-defined cardinal. How, they ask, could 
this be achieved without presupposing individuality? 
Dorato  and  Morganti  claim  that  to  grant  a  well-defined  cardinality  for  any 
plurality of items is itself the manifestation of individuality.  That is, individuality,  in 
some very minimal sense, consists of  numerical distinction, every item is numerically 
distinct from every other item, and self-identity, in the sense that every item is identical 
with itself. It is individuality in the sense comprised by both these features that Dorato 
and Morganti claim that quantum entities have, and they say it is primitive. That is, 
individuality, understood as self-identity and numerical diversity is a primitive feature 
of quantum particles, not grounded by anything else. What is really interesting is that 
the naturalistic idea according to which individuality should be somehow endorsed by 
quantum mechanics also appears here; that is, Dorato and Morganti argue that primitive 
individuality derives its great plausibility because quantum mechanics itself (in the non-
relativistic formulation) always presents situations comprising a plurality of items with 
well-defined cardinality.
Is  that  the end of non-individuality?  Not  at  all.  Notice  that  the claim is  that 
quantum  mechanics  should  favor  primitive  individuality  by  the  simple  fact  that  it 
presents us with cases in which a plurality of items should be taken for granted. And 
individuality in the minimal sense proposed above is needed to account for that feature, 
right? Not really. Notice that only a well-determined cardinality is being claimed here, 
and  that  quantum  mechanics  says  nothing  about  the  other  condition,  the  one  that 
requires every item to be self-identical. It seems we could simply abandon that claim 
and rest content only with the cardinal condition. Really, if we could grant that items 
without identity do make sense and may be gathered in collections with a well-defined 
cardinality,  then,  it  seems,  we have  a  good claim that  non-individuality  is  an even 
simpler position, assuming less concepts and allowing us to understand the main claims 
of quantum mechanics. 
In  this  paper  we  shall  argue  that  non-individuality  may  have  some  kind  of 
preference over individuality when this notion is understood precisely in the minimal 
sense sketched above. We shall point that even though quantum mechanics by itself 
does not decide the matter of whether an ontology of individuals or an ontology of non-
individuals  should  be  preferred,  there  are  other  kinds  of  reasoning  which  may  be 
employed to favor the non-individuality package. The kind of reasoning we are talking 
about  here  is  generally  accepted  as  good and virtuous  reasoning in  other  situations 
presenting  underdetermination:  metaphysical  economy  and  simplicity.  That  is,  non-
individuality may do with less what the individuality option does with more. We shall 
show that  some simple  formal  assumptions  and a  reasonable understanding of non-
individuals may be consistent with the idea of a plurality of indistinguishable items with 
a well-defined cardinal. The requirement that items be self-identical may well be left 
behind as an ontological excess. 
2. Non-individuality, individuality, cardinality
As we have been discussing, the idea that some items may be non-individuals 
appeared naturally in the early developments of quantum mechanics. The theory posed a 
theoretical framework in which some items, it seemed, had to be non-identifiable and 
obey  some  kind  of  permutation  symmetry.  That  is,  roughly  speaking,  in  quantum 
mechanical  systems  comprised  of  many  particles,  even  though  we  must  begin  the 
mathematical description by labeling the particles with natural numbers,  those labels 
play no relevant  metaphysical  role.  The fact  that  quantum particles  are  permutation 
symmetric grant us that permuting those labels will have no physical significance, in the 
precise sense that the expectation values for a measurement made in the system before 
the permutation will have the same expectation value as a measurement of the same 
quantity made after the permutation.
That fact is usually mentioned in connection with the particular statistics obeyed 
by quantum particles. It seems reasonable to study problems concerning individuality 
and identity for quantum particles looking at their statistical behavior, since we cannot 
look at one particle at each time and check its features. What the statistics obeyed by 
quantum particles revealed was that a permutation of particles’ labels does not give rise 
to  a distinct  state.  That  is,  particles’  labels  may be permuted  and the state  remains 
exactly the same. 
Obviously, not everyone agree with that description of the phenomena. As we 
mentioned before, Dorato and Morganti ((2011) section 6) have advanced the thesis that 
a well-defined cardinality is always presupposed by quantum mechanics. That is, we 
always start with a well-defined number of particles (in the non-relativistic theory), and 
only then we may go on to develop the usual mathematical  model  in Hilbert  space 
formalism. Starting with n particles of the same kind (that is, sharing the same intrinsic 
properties), we attribute a Hilbert space to each of them (the same Hilbert space in this 
case, in which the particles are indiscernible). The state space for the whole system is 
furnished by the tensor product of those Hilbert spaces. 
Now, Dorato and Morganti point out (loc. sit.), to grant that there will always be 
some well-defined number of particles, one must also grant individuality. That is, only 
once we agree that the items in question are already individuals we may be able to say 
with  full  meaning  that  there  are  n items,  even  if  the  items  in  question  are 
indistinguishable. So, it seems, those items  must be individuals, since that is precisely 
what we do in quantum mechanics. Individuality, here, is seen as involving self-identity 
and numerical distinction, in the sense that everything is identical to itself and distinct 
from every other thing. 
Then,  we  have  both  the  ingredients  discussed  briefly  in  the  first  section:  a 
metaphysical notion of individuality,  and some form of naturalism. According to the 
naturalistic  view in  action  here,  it  is  quantum mechanics  which  should  furnish  the 
information about the metaphysical nature of quantum particles. According to Dorato 
and Morganti, that is precisely what is happening: quantum mechanics tells us that there 
is  a  well-defined number  of  items,  and that  is  involved in  individuality,  mainly,  in 
individuality as a primitive feature of individuals. So, what more should we ask? Why 
don’t we accept primitive individuality for quantum particles?
One  could  point  that  the  relation  between  quantum mechanics,  well-defined 
cardinality and individuality is not so direct and obvious. The ties may be weaker than 
we first thought. First of all, only one feature of individuality as defined by Dorato and 
Morganti  was  applied,  the  idea  of  well-defined  cardinality.  Self-identity  was  not 
mentioned. Is it because quantum mechanics says nothing about self-identity? But then 
how could  we call  quantum mechanics  in  the  help  of  a  doctrine  which  needs  self-
identity as a central notion? In this case, self-identity seems to be a further metaphysical 
addition,  not  really  needed for  quantum mechanics  (and not  endorsed by it  either). 
However, the friend of individuality could object now: self-identity is really needed, 
since  it  is  necessary  to  determine  the  cardinal  number  of  collections  of  particles. 
Without  identity  there  is  no  sense  in  claiming  that  a  collection  has  a  well-defined 
cardinality (see also the arguments in Jantzen (2011), following the same lines). There 
comes our second point: what is being understood by a cardinal here? Really, of what 
sense of cardinality are we talking about?
Notice that this is a central question to be answered once our metaphysical thesis 
about individuality relies (at least indirectly) on a notion such as cardinal number (in the 
sense that there is a plurality of items comprising a collection). If we take cardinality to 
mean the usual von Neumann cardinal, which is an initial ordinal, then, no doubt some 
form of identity and maybe discernibility will be needed. However, if the idea is to 
preserve quantum indiscernibility,  then another notion of cardinal may be employed. 
Which notion is that? How does that relate to the issue of individuality? 
We shall propose that the link between individuality, identity and cardinality is 
not as strong as it may be thought at first sight. That is, we may abandon the idea that 
items are self-identical, and even so they may form collections that have a well-defined 
cardinality.  Since  such  a  view  is  tenable  (as  we  shall  see),  the  link  individuality-
cardinality  is  broken;  non-individuality  may  walk  side-by-side  with  well-defined 
cardinality. Since this last fact is all that is needed in the quantum mechanical picture, 
non-individuality  seems  to  be  the  simplest  assumption  for  an  ontology of  quantum 
mechanics. 
In the next section we prepare the formal basis for our understanding of how the 
notion of cardinality may be dissociated from identity and, hence, from individuality. 
We formalize the idea of a non-individual, and add to it some set theoretical principles. 
The result is quasi-set theory, the formal apparatus in which we shall built our definition 
of cardinality. 
3. Formal aspects of non-individuality
Now, given those features of non-individuals, we may profit from some rigor in 
the development of a metaphysical framework to deal with those entities. That is, we 
may develop in the main lines a formal system designed to deal with non-individuals 
and show that many interesting results may be derived from the simple assumption of 
non-individuality plus some usual set theoretical tools adapted to deal with them. In that 
sense,  we  shall  argue,  a  metaphysics  of  non-individuals  is  a  very  fruitful  research 
program, which should be pursued for its metaphysical plausibility and from the very 
natural way some features of quantum entities fit inside our framework. 
To begin, we develop an informal version of quasi-set theory Q (see the details 
in French and Krause (2006) chap. 7, French and Krause (2010)). This theory was built 
with the specific purpose of encoding in a formal system the idea of non-individuals and 
collections  of  non-individuals.  The  first  thing  that  must  be  clear  is  that  we  are 
employing first-order logic without identity. That is, the whole usual logical apparatus 
of quantifiers, variables, connectives and the like is available, but identity is not. The 
next step consists in delimiting the structure of the items dealt with in the theory, the 
basic entities. 
Now, since this is a theory about non-individuals, it seems reasonable to accept 
that some things are non-individuals. We put a predicate for them: m, in the sense that 
m(x) says that x is a non-individual, or, briefly, an m-atom. We also adopt a predicate 
for individuals: M, such that M(x) means that x is an individual, or, briefly, an M-atom. 
Our first assumption concerning those items is that nothing is both an individual and a 
non-individual, and that grants a separation in the intended universe of discourse, in the 
sense that there are two kinds of things, individuals and non-individuals. Furthermore, 
we do not postulate the existence of atoms of any kind. It is enough that the theory is 
consistent  with  their  existence  (as  in  the  standard  approaches  to  set  theory  with 
Urelemente).
Before  we  can  make  the  difference  between  individuals  and  non-individuals 
more explicit in the theory, we shall accept that items, be them either m-atoms or M-
atoms,  may  form collections,  or  aggregates.  To  achieve  that  aim,  we  assume  as  a 
primitive relation the usual membership  ∈ relation.  How is this relation supposed to 
work, since we have only atoms until now? Easy, we proceed as in usual set theories 
with atoms: a collection is something that is not an atom. To be more precise, we call 
the collections quasi-sets (or simply q-sets), and if x is a quasi-set we denote that fact by 
Q(x). Now, q-sets may have any one of the two kinds of atoms as elements, or also 
other q-sets. So, there comes the question: what is it that makes a non-individual a non-
individual? 
As we mentioned before, non-individuals have some characteristics which we 
expect to mimic in Q. The first of them that we have already obtained is that one may 
gather non-individuals in collections. That is, there are q-sets of m-atoms. The second 
feature concerns identity: non-individuals do not have identity. Since in Q the concept 
of identity may not hold for some entities, it seems we are at the good side. What about 
individuals? Well, we may define identity for the individuals and grant extensionality 
for q-sets: 
x = y =Def [Q(x) ∧ Q(y) ∧ ∀z(z∈x ↔ z∈y)] ∨ [M(x) ∧ M(y) ∧ ∀z(x∈z ↔ y∈z)]
That is, quasi-sets having the same elements are identical and M-atoms belonging to the 
same q-sets are identical. Then, identity is granted for the right things, but not for non-
individuals,  in the sense that it  does not make sense to say that a non-individual  is 
distinct  from  other  non-individual,  as  well  as  it  is  impossible  to  say  that  a  non-
individual is identical to itself. 
Before we go on to build q-sets, there is a further feature of non-individuals as 
they appear in quantum mechanics to be taken into account: they may be indiscernible. 
To express that fact, we introduce the binary relation symbol ≡, so that x ≡ y means that 
x is indiscernible from y. We agree that m-atoms may be indiscernible, and also grant 
that  for  items  that  are  not  m-atoms  indiscernibility  and  identity  are  equivalent. 
Obviously, for m-atoms that equivalence does not hold, since they cannot be related by 
identity; in this sense, identity and indiscernibility do not coincide for m-atoms, which 
may be indistinguishable but not identical. Another sense in which identity differs from 
indistinguishability concerns their relation to membership. We know that if x = y, then, 
i) for any z, if x∈z then also y∈z, and also ii) if for any z, if z∈x then also z∈y. In this 
sense, identity is said to be compatible with membership. Indistinguishability, however, 
should  not  be  compatible  with  membership  when  we  are  dealing  with  m-atoms. 
Indiscernible m-atoms need not belong to the same q-sets. In that sense, in  Q  it may 
happen that x ≡ y and x∈z, but that does not imply that necessarily it also happens that 
y∈z.
Having that in our hands,  we can now proceed to build quasi-sets.  Quasi-set 
theory encompasses basically the same principles employed to build sets in usual set 
theory:  we have  the  existence  of  an  empty  q-set,  unordered  pairs,  power  q-set,  the 
separation schema, union, infinity, regularity and the axiom of choice. The idea is that 
we  may  build  a  quasi-set  theoretical  hierarchy  of  q-sets,  just  like  the  usual  set 
theoretical hierarchy, but this time with two kinds of atoms. 
Some of the collections thus obtained will be of a distinct kind, they will contain 
only M-atoms or collections of M-atoms in their transitive closure. That is, when we 
investigate their elements, and the elements of their elements, and so on, we discover 
that no m-atoms are ever present. Those q-sets having that property we call classical q-
sets, or just sets for brevity. We denote sets in Q by the predicate Z, so that Z(x) means 
that  x is a q-set that is also a set. With sets we may build inside Q all of the classical 
mathematics available in ZFU.  
Our worries, however, are not with the classical side of the theory, but rather 
with the non-classical one. Some of its features, we have been arguing, are such that 
they  accommodate  the  non-individuals  picture.  There  are  two  further  issues  which 
should be mentioned and which represent very well the differences between a theory 
comprising only individuals and a theory comprising non-individuals.  The first point 
concerns the formation of unordered pairs. Since some of the items do not enter into the 
identity relation, we cannot say that a pair {x, y} is defined as a collection of the form 
{z:  z =  x or  z =y}. That definition would rule out pairs of m-atoms. To fix that, we 
assume as an axiom that there is a collection  z  having  x and  y as elements. With the 
schema of separation, then, we are able to separate from z a q-set w whose elements are 
those items belonging to z that are indistinguishable from x or from y. Notice that when 
x and y are not m-atoms, then, since identity and indiscernibility coincide, there is really 
no difference from what happens in classical set theories, and we denote the pair just 
like we do in those theories as {x, y}. However, when at least one of those items is an 
m-atom,  we  must  consider  the  possibility  of  z  having  more  than  one  element 
indistinguishable from x or from y, nothing prevents that. Then, in the pair w formed by 
the condition that its elements are those items belonging to z that are indistinguishable 
from x or from y, we may end with more than only x and y, that is, with more than two 
elements (in this explanation, cardinal statements such as “more than two elements” are 
taken only as an explanation  at  the metalevel,  to  be understood intuitively –but  see 
below). Those pairs are denoted by [x, y].
The second main difference concerns ordered pairs. If we are to follow the usual 
Kuratowski definition of ordered pairs, then the ordered pair <x, y> is defined as [[x], 
[x,y]]. As before, in the case those items are not m-atoms, the definition reduces to the 
classical case. However, when those items are m-atoms, some interesting results may be 
derived. Here we are assuming that [x] and [x,y] were obtained by separation from a q-
set  z. If  x is indistinguishable from y, it is easy to prove that when <x, y>, then also 
<y,x>, That is, indistinguishable m-atoms cannot be ordered. It does not make sense to 
say that one comes first then the other. So, it follows that we cannot define ordering 
relations for them. 
Now,  the  relation  of  that  fact  with  our  discussion  concerning  counting  and 
individuality seems clear. If items are indistinguishable and do not have identity, then 
we cannot order them. Without order, the collection of items in question cannot have an 
ordinal, in the sense that there is a first element, a second, and so on. Without ordinals, 
there  is  no cardinal  in  the  von Neumann sense,  according to  which  cardinals  are  a 
special kind of ordinals, known as initial ordinals. So, should we conclude that non-
individuals cannot be elements of collections with a well-defined cardinal? The answer 
is yes only if the concept of cardinal is defined in the von Neumann style (or any other 
style which makes essential use of the identity of the entities in question). However, 
nothing is said about distinct definitions of cardinality, for which those assumptions are 
not needed. In the next section we shall show how to make sense of the claim that there 
is a plurality of non-individuals by using the conceptual tools of quasi-set theory. We 
shall  show  that  cardinality  may  be  defined  without  identity  being  defined  for 
everything. 
Before we proceed, however, there are two further notions of Q which must be 
introduced:  the  notion  of  a  relation  and  the  concept  of  a  quasi-function.  A  binary 
relation is as usual a collection of ordered pairs, but recall that ordered pairs are being 
understood  in  the  weaker  sense  mentioned  above.  For  a  quasi-function,  some 
modifications in the usual concept of function must be provided. The intuitive idea here 
is that once we pick a domain and an item x in it, there is an image y in the image q-set. 
Also,  every  other  item in  the  domain  which  is  indistinguishable  from  x  should  be 
attributed  an  image  indistinguishable  from  y.  That  is,  a  quasi-function  maps 
indistinguishable  items  into  indistinguishable  images.  More  formally,  f  is  a  quasi-
function from A to B if and only if f is a quasi-relation between A and B such that for 
every x∈A there is a y∈B such that <x, y>∈f, and if <w, z>∈f and x≡w, then y≡z. Notice 
once  again  that  when  none  of  the  items  involved  is  a  m-atom,  then  the  definition 
collapses in the classical case. 
Now,  we  proceed  by  showing  how  a  notion  of  cardinality  may  be  derived 
without presupposing the identity of the items being counted. 
4. Counting, Cardinality and Non-Individuality
In this section we analyze the relationships between three concepts: counting, 
cardinality and non-individuality.  Firstly,  it  may be simply stated that  they are very 
closely related: to attribute cardinality to some collection, one must be able to count the 
items in it. Counting, on the other hand, is a kind of activity; one attributes numerals in 
an increasing order to the members of the collection. Obviously, the numerals must be 
uniquely attributed, so that each item is labeled only once with a numeral. Of course one 
can only do that to items having well-defined identity conditions, items able to bear 
labels,  and able  to  be  individuated.  So,  the  obvious  conclusion  would  be  that  only 
individuals can be counted,  can form collections with cardinality,  and so on (that is 
basically the idea exposed in Jantzen (2011), and seems to be accepted also by Dorato 
and Morganti (2011)).
Now, if that kind of reasoning is right, then the non-individuals metaphysical 
package for  quantum particles  is  in trouble.  Really,  under those circumstances,  that 
view will  not  be  able  to  explain  the  numerical  difference  of  particles  appearing  in 
quantum mechanics, not even the simple fact that in this theory we deal with systems 
comprising  multiple  particles.  So,  how  should  we  understand  those  notions  in  the 
context of a metaphysics of non-individuals? Can we make sure that identity does not 
sneaks in unnoticed in our conceptual framework when we apply the notion of cardinal? 
That is what we shall go into now.
The  first  point  to  be  noticed  is  that  the  relation  counting-cardinality  is  not 
something one should take for granted. First of all, even in classical set theory, such as 
Zermelo-Fraenkel, one can define cardinal numbers in such a way as to be completely 
divorced from a corresponding ordinal, for in fact, the definition making those links, the 
von Neumann definition, is only one among many different options. That shows that 
one does not need to link those notions so strictly. In the second place, counting is one 
of  the  notions  that  most  philosophers  have  taken  as  linked  with  a  principle  of 
individuation without much analysis, so that one should at least try to take a critical 
stance in relation to it before conclusions are drawn. Our point here will be that even 
though the  usual  understanding of  counting  does  seem to presuppose some kind of 
individuality,  one  does  not  need  to  be  concerned  with  it,  for  alternative  counting 
procedures may be used that do not rely on the identity of the counted items.
A first proposal to overcome the difficulties may be seen explicitly in the usual 
presentations  of  quasi-set  theory (see French and Krause (2006),  chap.  7).  When it 
comes to deal with cardinalities, in the usual approaches to the theory, it is the common 
strategy to deal with cardinalities simply to adopt as a primitive term the weaker notion 
of quasi-cardinals. The point behind this axiomatic approach is that even though one 
cannot  attribute  ordinals  to  collections  of  m-atoms  (since  we  cannot  define  order 
relations in them), one may still attribute them cardinals. That we do through the quasi-
cardinal axioms; we impose by force of axioms that every quasi-set has a cardinal, but 
not every quasi-set has an associated ordinal. Here, obviously, when we say that a q-set 
does not have an associated ordinal we mean that it is not associated in the usual way, 
through a bijection, to an ordinal. By the very fact that cardinals are also ordinals, every 
q-set  having a cardinal  does  also have an ordinal,  but that  ordinal  plays  no role  in 
ordering or labeling the elements of the q-set. If one does not feel comfortable with 
cardinals attributed by axioms, it is enough to remember that this is not a privilege of 
quasi-set theory, for sometimes one introduces cardinal in classical theories by means of 
axioms.
This  first  solution  may  be  seen  as  a  sharpening  of  proposal  made  by many 
authors, for example, Toraldo di Francia (1998). According to that proposal, one can 
keep both the non-individuality and the cardinality for quantum particles, but ordinals, 
understood as attributing an order to the elements of a collection of non-individuals 
must be avoided. In fact, that same idea may be seen as encapsulated in claims made by 
Redhead  and  Teller  (see  (1991),  (1992)).  According  to  those  authors,  the  very 
possibility of labeling things, as one apparently needs to do in the usual counting notion, 
does in fact imply some principle of individuality for the particles, something they have 
called,  not  surprisingly,  Label  Transcendental  Individuality.  Since  they  also  take 
particles to be indiscernible and non-individuals, instead of proposing that the notion of 
cardinal be taken as primitive,  they propose a shift to the Fock space formalism, in 
which  one  keeps  only  the  number  of  particles  in  each  situation,  but  no  labels  or 
counting would remain (but see French and Krause (2006) for a criticism of the idea 
that a Fock space formalism solves the problem).
Obviously,  those proposals have their own virtues and difficulties. In the first 
case,  in  attributing  cardinality  by  axioms,  one  may  complain  that  this  solves  the 
problem but does not explain why collections of non-individuals have a cardinal. They 
simply have it, as a brute fact (some people, of course, see it as a virtue). In the proposal 
to  shift  to  a  Fock  space  formalism,  the  difficulty  is  that  the  very  mathematical 
construction of the formalism is made through the use of Hilbert spaces, which on their 
turn use the forbidden notions of labeling and counting the particles. So, even though 
defensible, one may also want to look for an alternative solution.
A  third  proposal,  one  we  shall  investigate  here,  concerns  the  possibility  of 
defining cardinality for finite (for this moment understood only in the intuitive sense – 
but see below) collections of non-individuals. Obviously, we employ the framework of 
quasi-set theory to do exactly that. The idea is that one may define cardinality through 
some kind of non-standard definition of counting,  doing all  that  in such a way that 
identity is not needed for the items being counted. One such proposal was made, as we 
already mentioned, by Domenech and Holik (see (2007)). Their proposal consists of a 
simple idea: to know how many elements there are in a collection without having to 
identify or label them, one only needs to devise a procedure through which one can 
eliminate the members of the collection one by one, successively,  so that after some 
finite number of applications of the procedure one obtains an empty collection.  The 
number of elements in the collection is the number of times we applied the procedure to 
make  the  collection  empty.  Of  course,  that  was  only  a  metamathematical  intuitive 
description of the process, which, when defined in Q does not work in a succession of 
steps taken as a succession in time.
So, there are two basic problems to be solved if the idea works. First of all, one 
must make clear what are those units that are to be extracted from the collection and 
how we can be sure that they indeed have the desired properties of being ‘one’ item. 
That must be characterized without appeal to the notion of cardinal, obviously, and so, 
without making the one-to-one elimination a process of individuation of the entities. 
Granted that, we can be sure that, intuitively speaking, one is always taking one element 
from the collection in case. The second point to be taken care of concerns the extracting 
procedure. It must be furnished in such a way that one does not make appeal to the 
identity of the elements being extracted, mainly because the entities of the collections 
we  want  to  count  have  no  identity.  It  is  important  to  mention  that  our  process  of 
“elimination”  of  the  elements  of  a  q-set  act  in  a  very similar  way as  a  process  of 
ionization in chemistry. We want our definition to mirror that idea in the formal system.  
Of course someone can say that, in eliminating one element, we necessarily individuate 
it. This makes sense from the intuitive point of view. But, in the process of ionization, 
suppose  that  an  electron  is  eliminated  from the  outer  shell  of  a  certain  atom.  This 
electron merges with others in the laboratory, so that there will be no more sense in 
saying which electron is that one. Its supposed identity is lost forever; thus, how can we 
regard it  as  an individual?  The same happens here;  the  alleged individuality  of  the 
eliminated element shows only that it can be though of as a “something”, an entity of 
some kind, but of course not as having the standard properties we ascribe to individuals,  
and  we do not  need  to  think  of  it  as  having  self-identity.  So,  the  process  may  be 
performed  without  having  to  assume  or  presuppose  that  the  items  in  question  are 
individuals.
Satisfied both conditions above, one needs only to put the machinery to work in 
such a way that the extracting procedure takes one element at each time (metaphorically 
speaking), and that once it reaches the empty set we have somehow recorder the number 
of times we have applied the procedure, for that will give us our cardinal.
Now, that idea, despite its abstract appearance, may be seen as mirroring some 
kind of laboratory practice. In fact, one can think about situations in laboratory where 
we can employ a specific procedure to count the elements of a collection without being 
able to identify them. For an example of such procedure encapsulating the features of 
the counting notion proposed by Domenech and Holik, consider the case in which we 
wish to count how many electrons  an Helium atom has.  One possibility consists  in 
putting the atom in a cloud chamber and ionizing it with radiation; the result will be one 
track of an ion and one of an electron. Repeating the procedure, we would once again 
see the track of one ion and one electron. Now, after the second stage we cannot extract 
more electrons, and the process ends in two steps, so that we know that the atom had 
two electrons. Notice that it does not matter which electron was the first and which one 
was the second, we cannot identify them, although we can determine how many of them 
there are (see Domenech and Holik (2007), p. 867).
We believe that both features of the counting process thus proposed can be made 
clear in the framework of quasi-set theory, with the definition we shall propose now. 
This is not the definition advanced by Domenech and Holik themselves, but a simpler 
one (see Arenhart for more discussion (2011). It is a virtue of definitions like this one to 
make clear the conceptual separation between identity,  counting, and cardinality. The 
conceptual frameworks involving non-individuals benefit from such technical devices, 
since they make clear  some presuppositions  that  need not be assumed,  like the one 
linking identity, cardinals, and counting. Let us check the definition.
4.1 Finite quasi-cardinals in Q
Now,  let  us  see  more  closely  a  definition  of  finite  quasi-cardinals  in  Q,  a 
definition  which,  as  we  mentioned  before,  is  simpler  than  the  one  presented  by 
Domenech  and  Holik,  although  it  relies  on  the  same  guidelines  proposed  by those 
authors. For convenience only, instead of ‘quasi-cardinal’ we shall use throughout this 
section the simpler word ‘cardinal’. We shall not give all the details, since that would 
take  us  very  far,  but  we  give  all  the  relevant  definitions.  The  motivation  for  our 
definition, as we mentioned before, is very simple, and aims at reflecting some kind of 
laboratory practice: we can make a finite q-set empty simply by taking out its elements 
one at a time. We can then count the number of steps required for this process to end 
and put as a reasonable definition that this is the number of elements of the q-set, i.e., its 
cardinal  (once  again,  recall  that  this  is  a  heuristic  explanation  provided  in  the 
metalanguage). As we have discussed, this process does not make use of the identity of 
the elements being taken out, and so, it is suitable for collections of m-atoms. First of 
all, we formulate the axiom of choice, since we will need it:
(AC) If A is a q-set whose elements are non-empty q-sets, then there is a q-function f 
such that for every B belonging to A, f(B) ∈B.
The next important step comes from the fact that our procedure applies to finite 
q-sets only. This could be rendered impossible if the only definition of finiteness were 
the usual one, according to which a collection is finite if and only if there is a one to one 
correspondence between that collection and some natural number. The point here is that 
this definition of finiteness comprises also the very idea of counting we wish to avoid, 
the idea that one can label every element of the collection being counted. So, for the 
concept of a finite collection we employ the Tarskian definition of finiteness, one that 
does not suffer from those difficulties. Before stating that definition, we need the notion 
of a ⊂-minimal element (where ⊂ is proper inclusion):  
Given a q-set B whose elements are q-sets, we call an element A of B  ⊂-minimal if 
∀C(C∈B → ¬C ⊂ A).
Given that, the Tarski finite q-sets are defined as follows:
A q-set A is finite in the sense of Tarski if every non-empty collection of subsets of A 
has a ⊂-minimal element.
In  the  following,  finite  q-sets  shall  always  mean  Tarski-finite  q-sets,  unless 
otherwise stated. The next step is the definition of the strong singleton of an item A. As 
we mentioned before, one can introduce in Q the idea of a collection having intuitively 
only one element indiscernible from certain other thing, an m-atom, for instance. That 
definition may be introduced with the help of the notion of quasi-cardinal, when it is a 
primitive symbol of the theory, or it may alternatively be introduced by a definition not 
using that notion. Here, obviously, we must follow the second approach, since we do 
not have quasi-cardinals as primitive in our theory. We will denote by <A> the strong 
singleton of A (as in French and Krause (2006) p. 293).
i) If A∈B, we define SA by [s∈℘([B]): A∈s];
ii) <A> =Def ∩ T∈Sx T
The notion of strong singleton will play the role of unit we discussed before. 
Really, since our plan is to eliminate the elements of a collection one by one, we already 
have what are the things to be counted intuitively as one: strong singletons of elements 
from the collection. As we have already commented, the strong singleton of A is a q-set  
containing what we would intuitively take as  only one element indistinguishable from 
A. The point of whether the strong singleton have the right to claim to be a collection 
with only one element, since we do not have yet a notion of quasi-cardinal, was settled 
by Domenech and Holik.  These authors have proved that the strong singleton has a 
property  that  only  collections  with  one  element  should  intuitively  have:  their  only 
subsets are themselves and the empty q-set (see their (2007) p. 865). Or more clearly 
stated: for any <x>, if y ⊆ <x>, then either y is the empty q-set or y is <x> itself. So, it 
seems that  we are  done with  the  first  difficulty  mentioned  above,  that  is,  we have 
stipulated what is to count as a unity to be eliminated from every q-set in the counting 
procedure. 
Next, we must provide some procedure to extract strong singletons from any 
given collection. We do that through a quasi-function which, intuitively speaking, takes 
elements out of a q-set, one by one. We call this quasi-function  subtraction function. 
Given a finite q-set A, by (AC) there is a choice function g for ℘(A)\{∅}, where “\” 
denotes  the  difference  operation  between  q-sets.  Then,  we  define  the  subtraction 
function h from ℘(A) to ℘(A): 
1) If B ≠ ∅, then h(B) =  B\<g(B)>;  
2) If B = ∅, then h(B) = ∅.
The idea behind this definition is that h picks an element from each subset of A, 
extract it, and gives us back still another q-set, call it A’, which is a subset of A, and 
intuitively speaking, we should understand that the resulting subset A’ has one element 
less than A. Applying the function to the empty q-set results in the empty q-set again. 
Obviously, the motivation behind our proposal demands that we do not stop with A’ 
unless it is empty. So, we must explain now how we can iterate the extracting process. 
We do that through an application of the recursion theorem, which is a theorem of Q. 
We define by recursion a quasi-function f from the q-set of natural numbers to ℘(A):
1. f(0) = A;
2. f(n+1) = h(f(n)).
So, there we have it. That grants us a way to iterate the extraction process and 
allow us to arrive, in some point in the process, in the empty q-set. Really, we can be 
sure that the process will arrive at the empty q-set because A is a Tarski-finite q-set. The 
point can be proved this way: suppose that the quasi-function f defined above did not 
arrive at the empty q-set for some natural number n. Then, in this case we would have 
provided a  family  of  non-empty  q-sets  that  does  not  contain  a  ⊂-minimal  element, 
violating the hypothesis that A is Tarski finite. So, any finite q-set will have only a 
finite number of stages in the process of ‘eliminating’ its elements and coming to be 
empty. As we have already explained, we may reasonably define the cardinal of a finite 
q-set as the least number in which we have reached the empty q-set, that is, in which the 
collection is empty:
The cardinal of A, denoted qc(A), is the least natural number n such that f(n) = ∅.
For that definition to make perfect sense, one must show that the cardinal of a 
finite q-set is unique, so that the introduction of the symbol  qc may be justified. We 
shall not go into that here, mentioning only that it can be done (see the relevant proofs 
in Arenhart (2012)). Notice that we have made use of no further axiom to introduce the 
notion of cardinal, and then, if all we are interested in are finite collections, then we 
may  confidently  begin  with  Q without  any  notion  of  quasi-cardinal  as  a  primitive 
concept. Obviously, from that definition we could go on and establish other interesting 
results, as for example the one granting us that for objects satisfying Z, the cardinal as 
defined above coincides with the usual cardinal, defined through the ordinals. Then, our 
definition preserves the ideas already introduced by the classical definition of counting, 
and extends the notion of cardinal to collections of objects without identity.
Now, that seems to be a point in favor of a conceptual framework in which some 
of the entities do not have identity. Really, since much of what is done with identity can 
be done without it,  then, it seems, we can confidently claim that no trouble shall be 
faced on that front.  Our point  here is  that  the claims linking identity,  counting and 
cardinality are not definitive against an ontology of non-individuals, since, as we have 
showed, alternative notions may be rigorously presented which do not presuppose the 
ties  between  those  concepts.  This  is  a  typical  case  in  which,  if  you  want  to  show 
something works, then, show how to do it.
5. Conclusion 
Now, it seems, we are in a better position to answer to the question which is the 
title  of  this  paper,  that  is,  why  non-individuality?  We  have  seen  that  the  quantum 
formalism employs somehow the fact that items may come in pluralities. We label those 
items in order to be able to furnish the mathematical tools that allow us to formulate the 
theory  and  deal  with  the  physical  system.  Does  that  pose  in  itself  any  special 
metaphysical  constraint  on  the  nature  of  quantum  particles?  Dorato  and  Morganti 
(2011), as well as Jantzen (2011) think it does. According to those authors, the fact that 
there is a well-defined number of entities is a good evidence to grant that those items are 
individuals. Without identity for those items there would not be any sense in saying that 
there is a specific number of them. 
So,  quantum  mechanics  was  seen  as  furnishing  the  needed  support  for  a 
metaphysics of individuals, in which individuality was taken as a primitive ungrounded 
notion. There are two relevant aspects to that claim. First of all, quantum mechanics 
grants the support to the claim that there is a precise number of items in every occasion. 
Second, there is the metaphysical claim that it only makes sense to say that a situation 
comprises a precise number of items when those items are individuals. Since almost 
every  other  attempt  to  ground  quantum  particles’  individuality  has  its  weaknesses, 
individuality must be better taken as primitive, in the sense that individuals are self-
identical and numerically distinct from every other item. Then, putting both together, 
quantum  mechanics  favors  a  metaphysics  of  individuals,  in  which  individuality  is 
understood as primitive. 
We have argued that the link between what we get from quantum mechanics and 
individuality has a weak link. In fact, we may point to it precisely in the metaphysical 
part of the argument in the above paragraph: it is not necessary that items be individuals 
(or be self-identical) for a well-defined number of them in every situation. As we have 
seen, it makes perfect sense to attribute cardinality to collections of items for which 
identity  does  not  make  sense,  the  non-individuals.  So,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
metaphysical coherence, there is nothing wrong with a metaphysics of non-individuals. 
Also, it does the same job without assuming identity. 
From a naturalistic point of view, we see now, there is no compelling evidence 
that primitive individuality should be accepted on quantum mechanical grounds. The 
acceptance of that position requires that we link the stipulation of a cardinal number to 
any  collection  of  quantum  particles  with  individuality.  However,  that  is,  as  we 
mentioned, this is a metaphysical assumption,  and not something to be derived with 
necessity from quantum mechanics. As far as quantum theory goes, non-individuals are 
all we need and perhaps constitute the best metaphysics available.  
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